




The Green and the Cool: 





Policy debates on conflict research, which are mostly directly used to develop practices of 
intervention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and statebuilding, emanate from common epistemic 
and ontological frameworks. All have been produced and perpetuated by key institutions in the 
global north through their encounter with historical direct and structural violence, both north and 
south. Power has followed Enlightenment knowledge, along with its various biases and exclusions. 
Its progressive normative, political, economic, and social assumptions about a 'good society' and an 
'international community', have been fed through social science into the building of international 
institutions, IFIs, and the donor system. Using a method called ethnographic-biography, this article 
charts how the thrust of policy responses based on such assumptions have long tended to veer 
between interventionism, trusteeship, 'native administration' in disguise and the attempt to establish 
'cordon sanitaires' around conflict zones.  It argues that in reality, peace thinking is mutually 
constructed as both positive and hybrid, confirming earlier critical work, but the research methods 
deployed to engage with social actors are sorely underdeveloped. This is illustrated through an 
analysis of the work of ‘local’ conflict scholars on their own peacebuilding and statebuilding 
processes in Cyprus, Kosovo, and Timor Leste.  
                                                     





Introduction: the working entanglement of peace and power 
 
Policy debates on conflict research, which are mostly directly used to develop practices of 
intervention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and statebuilding, emanate from common epistemic 
and ontological frameworks focused on the state and the international.2 There is a long genealogy of 
such frameworks, which run back into liberal colonialism, as Mazower has argued,3 projecting 
power through history into the contemporary liberal international order. They connect to the UN 
and Bretton Woods and the donor systems, and the Eurocentric logic that drew them through into 
the contemporary (or recent) ‘liberal peace’ era.4 Similarly, critical development scholars, including 
Chambers and Escobar, have in their various ways pointed to how development practices are 
intimately connected with hegemony and dominant ideologies, even if they explicitly claim not to 
be.5 They often highlight the need to engage with actually existing claims being made in real 
development contexts, meaning everyday life and micropolitics,6 pointing to the virtual nature of 
much mainstream theory and policy, which posits ideal subjects, ideal states, and specific and 
unbendable goals related to historical epistemological frameworks, connected to existing power-
structures. 
                                                     
2 Eg, see, UN Secretary Report on “Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict”, 
A/63/881, 11 June 2009. 
3 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, Princeton University Press, 2009. 
4 Michael Doyle, “Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs”, Philosophy and public affairs, Vol 12, 
(summer and fall), 1983, pp.205-35, 323-53. 
5 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995: 
Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Longman, 1989.  
6 Ty Solomon & Brente J Steele, “Micro-moves in International Relations Theory”, EJIR, 
forthcoming 2016: Henri Lefebvre, The Critique of Everyday Life, Volume 1, John Moore trans., 
London: Verso, 1991 [1947]. 
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All have been produced and perpetuated by key institutions in the global north through their 
encounter with historical direct and structural violence, both north and south.7 Power– and the 
emergent ‘interventionary system’- has followed Enlightenment knowledge, along with its various 
biases and exclusions, leading to a technocratic rule of experts, in matters of development and 
peace.8 This has tended to produce an interventionary blueprint for the subject’s rights and needs, 
the nature of the state, and global governance. Standardization and homogenization is the order of 
this approach, with a telos of positive peace and development as the consequence of the natural 
evolution of this epistemology. It is relatively simple, efficient, and can be implemented without 
local knowledge, though political contacts are important. This allows for a type of standardized 
international civil service to circulate the conflict-affected world bringing liberal peace as a kind of 
bureaucratic, structural adjustment model, dependent upon its own internal legitimacy based on its 
liberal, Kantian and Republican epistemology.9 Its progressive normative, political, economic, and 
social assumptions about a 'good society', state, and an 'international community', have been fed 
through social science into the building of international institutions, IFIs, and the donor system. 
This has produced a framework for understanding conflict, which is based on the other's 
deficiencies in a social-Darwinist world of sovereign hierarchies. Liberal peace offers an escape, 
and it is such that it can be “programmed” by the existing international civil service.10 This is the 
basis for ‘conflict expertise’ or ‘expert knowledge’ which might then be separated from knowledge 
about conflict-affected societies, because the former follows external power, whereas the latter 
                                                     
7 J Comaroff & Comaroff, J, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward 
Africa, Colorado, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011. 
8 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, University of California 
Press, 2002. 
9 Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War", International 
Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2005, pp.87-112. 
10 Bertrand Badie, The Imported State, Stanford University Press, 2000. 
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might follow local power structures or indeed might prefer emancipatory and more hybrid forms of 
peace. 
However, the awkward question of what to do in the face of ongoing violence, resistance, and 
particularly what to do when powerful elites reject impositions on their sovereignty, requires 
intervention of varying sorts. Soft peacebuilding and developmental intervention is at one end of the 
political scale, whereas military intervention in peacekeeping or humanitarian forms moves towards 
more overt infringements of sovereignty and the emergence of socio-political engineering through 
neo-trusteeship (in the shape of peacebuilding, statebuilding, or long term peace processes, as seen 
in Cyprus, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste). The auto-legitimacy ascribed to the liberal epistemology of 
peace is also used to legitimate this full range of interventionary practices connecting, say 
peacebuilding in BiH with military intervention and neoliberal statebuilding in Afghanistan as part 
of the same suite of interventionary practices.11  
The whole range of interventionary practices constructs the conflict-affected individual as 
unable to achieve modernity without external assistance and offers a minimum level of existence to 
its subjects. It does not engage more than partially with the ontological and epistemological fields of 
that subject.12 Herein lies an increasingly agonistic tension, in which globalized individuals realise 
their positionality as subjects of intervention and react in discursive or more direct ways to broadly 
perceived inequalities. In many ways, this tension is productive, but in some, it is highly 
problematic. It represents autonomous political space for development in which more progressive 
forms of peace might emerge, but it also underlines the various inconsistencies of interventionary 
                                                     
11 Oliver P Richmond, Failed Statebuilding, Yale University Press, 2014. 
12 My Post-Liberal Peace (Routledge 2011) examines this issue, as do other texts, including Roger 
MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011: 
Severine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International 
Intervention, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014 & The Trouble With the Congo: Local 
Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
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epistemologies, connecting them with historical practices of domination and self-interest, 
unintended consequences, and thus their broad social de-legitimation. At the moment when 
intervention, which brings its own epistemology of peace and order with it, offers progress, it may 
be rejected as unsuitable or simply not going far enough by its subject recipients, who operate in 




Local claims and entanglements, and ethnographic biography 
 
Local voices often point to an understanding of how casual factors of conflict are transmitted from 
one part of the world to another in a long-term time scale of mutual co-implication, which has broad 
implications for a sustainable peace. An equitable and certainly more solidarist international order is 
needed just as much as reform is required in situ, from this liberal internationalist perspective. 
Marxist/ critical, post-colonial, and subaltern critiques all suggest that the structural framework of 
the international and state architecture, in the context of global capital and the materiality of 
geopolitical forces, tends to further marginalize the subject causing further resistance.14 For Marx, 
this is based on the way global capital structures a class system, leading to unjust power-relations. 
This undermines legal and political rights, a point made recently in Piketty’s study of modern 
capital.15 For post-colonial scholars, the dominant epistemology of progress legitimates neo- 
imperial hegemony and the eradication of diverse societies. However, as Marx saw the possibility 
                                                     
13 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001. 
14 Gayatri Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988, 
pp. 271–313. 
15 Thomas Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014. 
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of the global mobilization of labour, post-colonial scholars also ascribed the local limited agency in 
inducing hybridity as an indirect challenge to intervention, which in any case maintains a neo-
colonial order. A hybrid epistemology is emerging, one dually associated with more diverse 
political encounters, but also the revival of trusteeship or ‘native administration’ forms of 
intervention. A range of subaltern scholars have raised the possibility of the decolonization of such 
epistemology, offering a pluriversal mode of ‘progressive’ politics.16 They have highlighted 
previously ignored dimensions to modernization and so-called structural adjustment. 
Using ethnographic biography, a range of methods long discussed in anthropology,17 this 
essay charts how three conflict-affected scholars have navigated the thrust of policy responses 
based on such assumptions, and examines their own responses and insights. The paper proceeds by 
discursively analysing the growing evidence on key interventions on the part of the international 
community from the perspective of three scholars from Cyprus (Costas Constantinou), Kosovo 
(Gezim Visoka), and Timor-Leste (Josh Trindade), effectively through a literature review of their 
scholarship. This forms a biography in that it attempts to see their work as an expression, over a 
long period of time, with their engage with their own conflicts and international intervention. All 
three of these conflicts have long been subject to the programmatic policy statements about conflict 
which emanate from Hobbesian observations on civil war, Cold War and contemporary geopolitical 
thought such as that outlined say by Kissinger and Mearsheimer, and Kantian and Lockean liberal 
                                                     
16 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, 
Duke University Press Books, 2011.  
17 Michael Herzfeld, Portrait of a Greek Imagination: An Ethnographic Biography of Andreas 
Nenedakis, University of Chicago, 1998: S Brandes, “Ethnographic autobiographies in American 
anthropology”, Central Issues in Anthropology, l, 1, 1979; D Hayano, “Auto-ethnography: 
paradigms, problems, and prospects”, Human Organization, Vol.38, 1979,  pp.99-104. DE Reed-
Danahay, Auto-ethnography: rewriting the self and the social, New York: Berg. 1997;  Harry F. 
Wolcott, “The Ethnographic Autobiography”, Auto/Biography, 2004; Vol. 12: pp.93-106. 
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peace theory.18 ‘Fixing’ these states through mediation, peacekeeping, development, peacebuilding 
and statebuilding rests on a blend of this body of knowledge with Kantian, republican 
epistemology, to build peace, along with concurrent neoliberal economic and legal rationalities of 
states in the current global governance system. Such rationalities have inevitably been disseminated 
by power- as legitimate authority in many cases- whether the UN system, human rights norms, and 
key donors and their foreign policies. 
 These three scholars, partly trained in the UK, US, or Australia, have been involved in local 
peace movements, the state, worked with international actors, and produced a significant volume of 
work critiquing or construing them. They have all also had high-level policy experience from within 
their own governments and administrations, directly related to the process of state stabilization and 
peace. In other words, they have learned IR from core metropolitan centres, worked in the state 
system and in their own state frameworks, critically engaged with the theories of peace and 
development, and often juxtaposed all of these with identity, rights,  needs, and agency in their own 
specific contexts.  Their work speaks through context, theory, and practice, towards some sort of 
epistemological symbiosis, specific to the breadth of experience they have had.19 If we are to 
understand the encounter between peace making forces from the outside, which carry their own 
epistemological baggage, how better  than to engage with the discussions and critiques from 
scholars who have experienced the conflict, the interventions, and are well-versed in bridging the 
debates surrounding them?  
In all of these cases, authority has been drawn from contradictory sources and different forms 
of legitimacy have competed with each other rather than forming settled norms of association 
through the liberal state. The Cyprus intervention began through old-fashioned peacekeeping in an 
                                                     
18 Daniel H. Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global 
Village, Princeton University Press, 2008. 
19 All three have given their permission for my use of their work, and to make them a kind of ‘case 
study’, as follows. 
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era when a cease-fire and a high-level diplomatic agreement was all that was required. People were 
absent from diplomatic discussion, but ethno-nationalist elites were ever present. By the 1990s the 
EU was offering its mantle of integration and ‘europeanisation’ as an escape route from the conflict. 
The Kosovo and Timor conflicts spilled over into the post-Cold War environment and so were 
subject to a mixture of structural development, liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding. 
The liberal peace framework was ever present, and has become a source of patronage around which 
power-sharing is centered. A careful engagement with the complexities of social history was rarely 
achieved or even possible from the external perspective, so they wrote about just this. 
I have chosen these three cases and scholars because I have worked with them previously and 
discussed these issues often with them, as well as having co-written pieces that engage with such 
matters with two of them. The goal of this paper is to let these three scholars speak through my own 
critical analysis (and bias) about the nature of external conflict epistemology, and the complexity of 
their positionality.20 They mount their critiques of the various interventions that were supposed to 
bring peace, and speak about peace from a local positionality coloured by their transnational 
experiences. I will try to capture some insights through their approaches to concepts and theory, 
rationality, methodology. All the usual caveats about the limitations of such ethno-biographical 
methodological approaches apply. I implicitly draw upon a range of literatures on hybridity, 
subaltern agency, ethnography and auto-ethnography, as well as standard critical theory. I accept 
that this essay is partly autobiographical and based up my own experiences of these three conflicts 
and people who work around them.21 I think it is significant that such hybrid expertise exists today, 
and I might extend my argument to say that my subjects are the experts who could rule legitimately 
                                                     
20 Linda Tuhai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, London: Zed Books, 1999, p.88: Robert 
Chambers, Rural Development, London: Longman, 1983; Michael M. Cernea, Putting People First: 
Sociological Variables in Development, OUP, 1985, p.8. 
21 Eg Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, “Autoethnographic International Relations,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 36, No 3, 2010, pp. 779-98. 
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in a broader milieu than that of the narrow local or international scales and their currently rather 
isolated systems of parallel legitimate authority and governance. 
 
 
Costas Constantinou on the peace process, diplomacy and everyday peace/ hybridity in 
Cyprus 
 
Costas Constantinou is a scholar who has worked in universities in the UK and Cyprus, and has 
been involved in practical and academic terms in the country’s long-standing peace process both at 
the diplomatic and social level. He has been directly affected by the conflict, and has lived through 
invasion and reconstruction and well as numerous peace efforts. He is a prominent figure in the 
island’s inter-communal movement, and his work is aimed at deep political and social 
reconciliation, along with many others. His scholarly career began with a critical discussion of 
diplomacy, which seemed calculated to point to the ineffective, arcane rituals that had evolved over 
history in terms of IR theory,22 but which in their application closer to home (meaning in the 
Cyprus conflict) had failed to yield their promise of either a moderation of interests and a balance of 
power, of a compromise agreement worked out through various different modes of political 
discourse. Having treated the failure of Western diplomacy in this manner, his work then also turns 
to the other oddities of the encounter between Cyprus and various modes of intervention. He 
examined at the relics of Empire in an article with myself on the British bases, and argued that 
Empire still maintained an exceptional presence even despite the post-1960 era of sovereign 
independence (supposedly at least).  This argument is extended into a discussion of the exceptions 
to Cyprus’ sovereignty made on independence in 1960, the clear implication that this is an oddity of 
                                                     
22 Costas M. Constantinou. On the Way to Diplomacy. Minneapolis University Press, 1996. 
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modern post-colonial statehood.23 What is significant about this argument are the implications for 
disparate societies and individuals in Cyprus, which end up being alienated from Cyprus as a 
concept and as a state, looking elsewhere for forms of legitimacy. 
From here his work turns to the dividing green-line across the island, and its interesting status, 
and most notably the oversight in most literature on Cyprus of the processes of historical 
reconciliation of ethnic and religious difference.  He also then turns to an examination of one of the 
forgotten minorities of the island- the Maronite community- who have worked out practices of co-
existence around the fault-lines cause by Greek and Turkish Cypriot conflict.24 Recurring motifs in 
his work are the long-standing existence of hybridity, the mono-culture of diplomacy and the need 
to expand it, the privatization of the Cyprus settlement and concurrent domination of the 
negotiations though the Cypriot and international states of exception, international versions of 
(il)liberal peace, and the emergence of human/self-diplomacy in everyday encounters.25 
His view of the negative peace that has emerged in Cyprus since 1974 is that it is a partial 
peace in which the common qualities that one might expect of liberal peace are only available 
because of the legacy of the war spanning 1963-1974, because of colonialism, and because of 
international blind-spots. This is an illiberal peace based upon forced division and loss. Most local 
people, whether nationalists or not, assume a better form of peace can be arrived at, even including 
international actors who have seen failure after failure of formal peace talks, but the majority see 
this better peace through a nationalist and sovereign rather than pluralist lens. Current 
                                                     
23 Costas M Constantinou, “On the Cypriot States of Exception”, International Political Sociology, 
Vol. 2, 2008, pp.145-164. 
24 Costas M. Constantinou, The Third Motherland,  Documentary 2011. 
25 Costas M. Constantinou. "Everyday Diplomacy: Mission, Spectacle and the Remaking of 
Diplomatic Culture" , in Jason Dittmer and Fiona McConnell, Diplomatic Cultures and 
International Politics London: Routledge 2016. 
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circumstances may be illiberal, but he also concludes that many see the liberal peace as empty but 
useful rhetoric- and have something else in mind.26 
Constantinou’s work displays a general appreciation but also a dissatisfaction with the 
perspectives of the western academy on Cyprus in IR. Entwined in the progress made in 
understanding are parallel blockages to understanding more, an appreciation of diversity, and 
overall epistemological and perhaps ontological obstacles to peace. Such contradictions are present 
on the island and in the international epistemology produced on the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and the 
notion of a ‘settlement’ or ‘solution’.27 In much of his more recent work, he establishes a critique of 
international roles as being configured by interests, norms, and approaches which have weak appeal 
or traction in Cyprus because they emerge from a different site of legitimate authority, however 
well-meaning they may be.28 Instead, he often points to the actual reality of everyday encounters in 
Cyprus, which is beginning to shape an alternative political settlement, one which is rarely captured 
by external pronouncements on Cyprus. The settlement is thus being ‘privatised’ but not in a 
neoliberal sense.29 Within the state of exception that are the Cypriot states, these are negotiating a 
form of peace more salient in reality than futile diplomatic/ territorial identity rituals over a peace 
agreement within a Westphalian ontology. Constantinou appears to argue that the current situation 
is not a solution, but is more an imaginative way of living together after the conflict and the failure 
of many international diplomatic efforts under the resultant structural conditions that have 
emerged.30 
                                                     
26 Costas Constantinou & Constantinos Adamides, “Comfortable and Illiberal Peace in Cyprus”, in 
Oliver P Richmond & Audra Mitchell, Hybrid Peace, London: Palgrave, 2012.  
27 Costas M Constantinou, “Multidirectional Diplomacy and the Privatisation of Settlement”, Peace 
Review, Vol. 24, ??  pp.454-461. 
28 Ibid., p.460. 
29 Ibid., p. 460. 
30 Ibid., p.461. 
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Over the course of more than a decade, in his work one can see a deconstruction of 
mainstream IR theory and related notions of peace and an indication of the power relations that are 
denoted by their intricacies and disguises. One can also began to see the reconstruction of a 
narrative of reconciliation which is much more aesthetically oriented than the external (and often 
internal) instrumentalist and rationalist discourses about the state and geopolitics. His positionality 
is somewhat conflicted then about how the Cyprus problem has been constructed and reconstructed 
and the depth of a relationality between the communities on the island and in the region. One 
receives the impression that he has detected a subterranean relationality that is far more deep-rooted 
and pervasive that most analysts would expect. Some of his work describes Cyprus as if he were not 
fully part of the societies there (a hint of methodological neutrality). There are only hints about 
what the nature of peace might be in Cyprus in his work, if reconstructed from the issues his work 
interrogates: post-colonialism and the bothersome remnants of colonialism, the exclusions of 
sovereignty,  the historical possibilities in hybridity, everyday diplomacy, the transgressions that 
take place against power, the ‘other’ minorities, and the importance of discursive reconciliation 
even when formal political issues remain unsettled.31  
External parties’ epistemological perspectives are appreciated for their efforts and their 
attempts to bring basic standards to political debate, but also seen as superficial, single minded, and 
often connected to the very power structures that caused the conflicts in the first place (colonialism 
and the exclusive nation state). Peace can thus only be located at the everyday nexus, where 
interactions, diplomatic, cultural, and others, allow for reconciliation in the absence of political 
agreement. Indeed, in some of his work he turns to a discussion of a concept he has created “homo-
diplomacy” in which the self gains knowledge about how to live in the world as it actually is, rather 
than as it might be suggested to be according to more old fashion diplomatic, strategic or liberal 
                                                     
31 Costas M. Constantinou, "Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of 
Knowledge", International Studies Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2, 2013. 
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thought.32 Experience and experiments are used in everyday life to navigate around the legacies of 
old style thinking about the state, war, politics, and diplomacy, and to re-imagine human relations.  
Again, the particular paper that outlines this approach- though not on Cyprus- offers a clear sign of 
the inadequacies of mainstream conflict knowledge in its ‘Cartesian’ formulation, and the need for 
more depth, and more reflexivity- a ‘gnostic way’.33 One clear message is that mediating difference 
should not be taken as an ethnic issue to be carried out by formal diplomacy and built into a legal 
state-level agreement, but that mediation needs to reach far deeper and more broadly in and across 
what it means to be human in agonistic societies. We might take this to point to the problem of 
understanding the conflict-affected human in modernity. 
Constantinou illustrates this development in his thinking about the mistakenly named ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ by turning to examples of complex hybridity.34 He sees a historical alliance of colonial 
and nationalist frameworks giving birth to the ethno-territorial division of the island, and what he 
calls a contemporary ‘static bicommunal system’, also representing modern governmentality, such 
as that brought by external perspectives on peace and conflict. He points to empirical evidence 
about long-standing hybridity and syncretism on the island, which contradict the moral 
categorization of ethnicity as the only basis for static, territorial and state governmental 
frameworks. The implication of this more relational analysis is clearly a self-evident but normally 
overlooked truth. The conflict is an international/ local production: a mixture of orientalism, 
nationalism, colonialism, stratification, and governmentality. The international production of peace 
has failed, however, precisely because it repeats the very systemic assumptions which caused the 
                                                     
32 Costas M Constantinou, “On Homo-Diplomacy”, Space and Culture, Vol. 9, No.4, 2006, pp.351-
364. 
33 Ibid., p. 362. 
34 Costas M Constantinou, “Aporias of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity, and the Cyprus 
Problem”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp.247-270. 
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conflict in the first place- colonialism, nationalism, a focus on power-sharing and the state, and 
various other binaries and problematic authorisations upon which the modern state and peace rest.  
According to Constantinou’s research, there are progressive practices already historically 
present in the very ‘local’ the international and a range of local actors seek to transform, some of 
which as associated with the spiritual, cultural and the emotional spheres, according to his overall 
oeuvre.35 Constantinou’s work has trodden a careful line between engaging with received 
international knowledge about peace and conflict, engaging with nationalist and reconciliatory 
voices in Cyprus, and engaging with Turkish/ Turkish Cypriot work on Cyprus too (often at a time 
when this was more or less proscribed). Clearly his work foregrounds the social, and its ability to 
negotiate and mediate a polity on its own terms- something that Cyprus has not done formally as a 
unitary actor, but has done informally through a range of interlocking political communities. To 
some extent it points to context in Cyprus as operating in a different temporal zone and 
consciousness to Euro-centric ‘metropolitan time’, not just as different mechanism of rational and 
nationalist governance and society, and offering a different and more relational political ontology.   
His work betrays a concern that the essence of the decolonized, power-sharing, state and 
sovereignty may contribute not to the solution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ but are the essence of the 
problem itself. Perhaps the EU’s ‘normative power’ might save Cyprus, but there again he connects 
this, somewhat ambivalently, to previous colonial projects, thus underlining a common ambivalence 
about the place of intervention- broadly defined- in the modern world, as well as the limits of the 
state as a peace framework, and the limits of modern diplomacy as its method. 
 
 
Gezim Visoka on dominant culture, and hybrid/ progressive peace in Kosovo 
                                                     
35 Costas M Constantinou & Mete Hatay, “Cyprus, ethnic conflict and conflict heritage”, Ethnic and 




Gezim Visoka’s work on Kosovo offers a broad and detailed critique of many aspects of the 
international’s peacebuilding and statebuilding programme in that country. He is both a scholar, and 
has formerly worked for international organisations and NGOs, as well in the policy sector. He was 
caught up in the conflict in Kosovo and experienced the intervention, as well as the reconstruction 
efforts. Later he became directly involved in them from a number of different directions. The 
underlying thrust of his work’s oeuvre is that peace intervention has not dealt with underlying 
conflict causes, brought justice, or indicated much external comprehension of the problems or 
potential of local political agency. Indeed, it has failed to connect to the underlying sources of social 
legitimacy in Kosovo.  His work defends the autonomy of Kosovo as a pluralist state project in 
modernity, whilst also seeking international support to extend peace and buttress its status.36 He 
sees the interventionary process as driven by external dominant culture, interests, and programming 
mentalities. He argues that it is disinterested in the realities of local political life.  As a consequence 
there has been a range of subtle and overt resistances (co-optations, etc) to peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, on the premise that such processes are exclusionary and lack local legitimacy because 
they cannot recognize their own or local dominant political cultures accurately.37 With respect to 
the UN mission in Kosovo, he describes it as eventually becoming an institutionalized, legacy form 
of unaccountable power, even though there is the ongoing theatre of an international ombudsperson 
and a human rights advisory panel in place.38  He argues that UNMIK and other international 
organisations consequently lost the trust of local populations, and ultimately this also encouraged 
                                                     
36 Gezim Visoka, “The Complex Nature and Implications of International Engagement after 
Kosovo’s Independence”, Civil Wars, vol. 13, No. 2, pp.189-214. 
37 Gezim Visoka, “International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo”, Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, Vol.22, pp.99-125. 
38 Gezim Visoka, “The ‘Kafkasque Accountability of International Governance in Kosovo”, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding,Vol.6, No.2, p.189. 
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undemocratic processes and abuses on the ground in Kosovo, factors which have also begun to 
affect the EU’s role. 
However, he also sees the necessity of international involvement both to dismantle existing 
regional and local power structures and to establish a more progressive alternative. He is fairly clear 
that the EU and its regional integration project offers the prospect of a better peace. However, 
internationals see this as a source of conditionality, which is their way of mediating the encounters 
that are taking place around Kosovo. Internationals are unable and unwilling to unravel localized 
epistemologies that would make sense of their encounters in Kosovo, nor to ‘share’ the EU, but 
instead adopt a programmatic and conditionality oriented approach. This allows them to conduct 
themselves according to a semi-orientalised understanding local political and identity, as well as to 
legitimate the framework of the state they have engaged in building. This promotes unaccountable 
power, both internationally and locally. Simultaneously this allows for conditionality to be imposed 
on society by external actors, formerly the UN, and now the EU. The net result for Visoka is the 
realization of the limits of external capacity,39 following the earlier realization of the limits or 
underground and parallel agency during the period of Serb oppression. The international’s attempt 
to build a new form of liberal authority to replace Serb domination, and to replace the Kosovan 
parallel institutions has failed, partly because of bias, partly because of ignorance, and partly 
because of the limits of international power: so now all three types of agency are entangled.40 
Visoka argues in some of his work that the sources of knowledge internationals use for 
thinking about peace need to be reoriented. Embedded knowledge, personal experience, everyday 
observations and sense-making, interviews both formal and informal with relevant actors but also 
random people, as well as readings of daily press, policy reports, and academic work, can all be 
used to construe a picture, but this is a picture that is necessarily biased by the third party 
                                                     
39 Gezim Visoka, “Peace is what we make of it?”, unpublished paper, 2014. 
40 Gezim Visoka, Personal Interview, Pristina, 23 May 2016. 
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researcher’s positionality, whether local or international. Understanding positionality therefore is 
crucial, and some of Visoka’s work implicitly points to the problem of international-local inequality 
across a range of areas.  He appears to argue that modes of thinking and theorizing in around the 
field of conflict affected societies are entangled in a heap of different knowledge systems, many of 
which are both internally and externally contradictory.  
For Visoka, a Kosovan peace would require a reconstruction of politics, the state, and the full 
framework of peace through such contradictions, within which other forms of knowing would be 
fully included. This does not appear to be a rejection of the liberal peace, and his work 
acknowledges the local and regional problems that the state of Kosovo and any ambition for a 
progressive peace, faces. Much of Kosovan political agency has been aimed at state formation, 
joining the EU, and attaining membership of international organisations over the last decade or so. 
However, local epistemologies of peace and conflict represent a positionality from which to 
understand intervention and its complexes. For him, the subaltern and vulnerable in society should 
be a focus, but power-structures tend to receive the most attention, much of it unwilling to judge the 
nature of any specific power structure let alone intervene in them. Thus, Visoka argues that local 
epistemologies are trying to overcome the externalized, instrumental and technocratic approach to 
peace, which ironically rejects their own salience.  This problem is compounded by the lack of 
longer-term accountability for intervention.41 He argues that local knowledge about peace can be 
situational and contextual and can be both problem-solving and emancipatory. The surprise is that 
he still sees the possibility of an emancipatory form of peace in Kosovo, even after his critique of 
intervention and local responses to it. For him, state recognition, autonomy and local agency appear 
to frame its putative character.  
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Some of his work helps uncover the work of local organizations (eg Balkan Sunflowers and 
others) and networks which remain involved in peace work despite the widespread rejection of 
international conditionality, and the hybrid modification of the liberal peace  and state framework 
they offer.42 Many of these organizations exercise resistance and autonomy in the face of 
hegemony, in his view, but are also implicated in a relatively common project of peace with each 
other and with hegemony.43 Indeed, this has been a historical pattern, which some of his work 
reconstructs in detail.44 Their impact is relatively invisible, long term, and slow moving, but they 
are acknowledged informally in society, and might be translated eventually into more formal and 
viable political institutions. Visoka treads a careful line between supporting critical thinking on 
peace, and attempting to disseminate it in Kosovo, and supporting the recognition project of the 
self-declared state in the modern states-system as it is, both academically and professionally. Again, 
I would say that a sense of the peaceful state as a social democracy permeates his work, but it is 
also a territorialized, ethnicised but mediated form of state. In the final analysis his work points to 
the limits of the state in dealing with such conflicts, but also that we only really have the state as a 
vehicle for peace. His work uncovers the relationality of any interventionary praxis, inherent in any 
emergent form of hybridity. 
 
 
Josh Trindade, Custom, Hybridity and the Ideal State in Timor Leste  
 
Josh Trindade is another policymaker-scholar, who was directly affected by the conflict, was part of 
the reconstruction process afterwards, also contributing significantly to scholarship on Timor-Leste, 
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working with donors, and later for Timor’s President himself. He wrote one of his key papers on 
Timor-Leste’s development whilst in a refugee camp. As with my other examples, he is well versed 
in international peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development policy. He has been directly involved 
in advising the Timorese president on how to build a legitimate ‘ideal’ Timor-Leste. He draws on 
international liberal sources of knowledge and local custom. The ideal state is closely connected to 
the old social- national dream of democracy and statehood (as far as I can see) combine with the 
deeper history of the Timorese people. Like Visoka, the state is an essential political project that is 
connected to territory and identity, peace and order, with utopian leanings. 
Like Constantinou and Visoka, quite a lot of his work treads a line between soliciting the 
support and attention of international actors, guiding yet critiquing them, and also the rediscovery of 
past, pluralist social practices and sources of legitimacy, lost due to colonialism, conflict, and 
nationalism.45 As with my other two authors (who are authors of their own local peace and state), he 
accepts that the state must be the centre of a new peace system, requiring a range of inputs, and 
perspectives, probably being hybrid, and perhaps not necessarily being as sovereign in territorial 
terms as one might expect, but certainly sovereign in spiritual terms. 
 As with Constantinou’s work, there is the element of the spiritual about his depiction of local 
political  community and its history of formation. This spiritual dimension is deeply alien although 
potentially compatible with the modern state and modern economy, according to him.46 It is the 
basis of legitimate authority for him, and for much of the Timorese population. The ‘Uma Lulik’ 
(sacred house system), customary forms of law and political authority, is part of this, but it is 
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inaccessible to outsiders because of epistemological barriers. It governs all social relations in the 
name of order, peace and tranquility, through balancing. It does so in the context of natural 
conditions in Timor. Indeed most insiders see it as animist and therefore as illegitimate knowledge 
(uncivilized). It has not been written down because local languages (Tetum) have not until recently 
been written languages (Trindade has been involved in developing transcription, modern 
vocabulary, and the written archive every constitutional state requires). He has developed a 
complex map of the lulik, which might be compared to other crucial political statements on rights, 
constitutions, and law in western history.47 It constitutes a rescued archive from the past for 
Timorese people, but also a mediated translation for outsiders. It has progressive components, 
which are related to democracy, and gender, surprisingly enough to some. Inadvertently, 
internationals recognized Lulik in the national constitution they helped develop through that 
constitution’s recognition of culture and cultural heritage (Article 59.5). 
This does not mean that there is nothing that is legitimate about interventionary processes, 
however, but he feels that they have been relatively ineffective, especially when isolated from the 
Timorese lifeworld.48 He is clear that all identities are constructed, and hence presumably can be 
tampered with, and perhaps should be for the sake of peace and progress within the state. The state 
thus is a vehicle for modernization and unity. But likewise, his work suggests that there are local 
bases of legitimate authority in Timor, which need to be translated in order to educate outsiders, but 
are perhaps more mutable and more progressive than outsiders often expect. The state thus also has 
                                                     
47 Ibid. 
48 Jose ‘Josh’ Trindade,  “Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The Lorosa’e – 
Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective”,  The European Union’s Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism Programme Technical Assistance to the National Dialogue Process in Timor-Leste, 
Dili, Timor-Leste, 6th June 2007. 
21 
 
to represent the people as they were in the past, as they are now, and as they would be in an ideal 
situation.49 
At times his work points to fairly advanced political and social practices in Timorese history 
to show that liberal thought is not new. He wishes to discover a nation for the new state of Timor, 
and looking at liberal, rational, secular, legalistic thought from his outsider positionality, not to 
mention neoliberalism, he does not find the essential components of Timorese nationhood. He sees 
this in relatively hidden- to external eyes- common belief systems about Timor and societal and 
political life.50  
Indeed, some of his recent work points to a phenomena, also present in Constantinou’s work, 
but in more exaggerated form (to Western eyes): alterity. He is unashamed (and certainly justified) 
to write of politics in Timor at the social level being motivated by a utopian desire for ‘tranquil 
time’ (echoing Augustine’s connection between tranquility and order) and ‘the green and the 
cool’.51  The ‘green and the cool’ is a common concept used across all Timorese language groups, 
referring to peace and the good life. This means that people have achieved ‘tranquil time’, which is 
also a reference to mythical memories of a pre-colonial, peaceful idyll in Timor. If peace is not 
present, then another common concept is ‘the chanting of the suffering’, which is literally a call for 
help from outsiders. It may be a ritual, or it may be real and reactive. During the Indonesian 
occupation, it represented a call for outside political and military help, whereas in current times the 
call is most often made for clean water, better roads, and other public services.52 During Indonesian 
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times, Trindade was part of a complex and global network of  secret activists, advocates, and 
resisters seeking to lay the basis through which the state may form and thus respond. 
 Clearly, Trindade yearns for unity across a long-divided series of political communities in 
Timor: he works toward it, advises the President and internationals, and also produces academic 
papers, which he sees as an evolving and eventually formal basis for the reconstitution of Timorese 
political life. Resolving identity matters is crucial to avoiding and responding to violence and the 
reconstruction of Timor not just as a state but as a society, through a unity of diversity53- perhaps as 
with my other two authors. He sees its potential in the symbolic social and political capital- 
legitimate authority- at the village level, which might be extended to the state-level.  Perhaps he is 
inventing a progressive past and romanticizing the nation all by himself, but he is clearly in an 
influential and privileged position to be able to do so. He also argues extensively that international 
statebuilding has failed to live up to even its own limited standards and objectives in practice.54 Its 
failure to engage with the ‘hidden’ life-world of Timor is partly to blame for its inability to solve 
political issues, social problems, or really spark off development in the state and the economy 
through social and political unity.  
Perhaps Trindade’s work comes closest to offering a window into an alternative political 
philosophy (and cosmology) and its attempt to co-exist with the modern state and global economy. 
Its ontology is very distant from a discussion of constitutions, law, bureaucracy, stratification, class, 
power, agency, or structure as confluent representatives of the seminal historical moments in the life 
of a state and society. Most other scholars, and including my other two biographical examples, are 
perhaps shy about revealing the alternative cosmologies that legend has it guided politics in their 
own contexts. This is not the language of western science, but somehow it is the socio-political 
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language of many of the people of Timor. It points to a problematic gap between international 
policy and local, transversal, sometimes transnational lifeworlds, which I am sure some of my 
subjects might say is plugged either by well-meaning ignorance masquerading as governmental 
policy, or careless power at elite and international levels. For Trindade, the ideal state and 
concurrent peace of tranquility, greenness, and coolness, seems to encompass a Timorese lifeworld, 
custom, and contradictorily, the modern liberal and social democratic state. Once again the concept 
of the state as a vehicle for peace with the assistance of law bound practices of intervention are 
being tested in his work by the local historical dimensions of legitimacy. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Green and the Cool 
 
The three countries referred to through my ethnographic biographies in this article are witnessing 
the emergence of voices and theoreticians with wide and local experience: one might say they are 
the theoretical equivalents of John Stuart Mill, Tom Paine, John Locke, and other bastions of 
foundational thought for the state and the international in its Western, post-Enlightenment form. 
But, Mill et al had the British Empire, American power, and many other resources at their disposal, 
which helped them capture the debate about the state and the international.  
The three scholars I have examined critique how external interventions have long tended to 
veer between realist isolationalism  and the attempt to establish 'cordon sanitaires' around conflict 
zones, deploying liberal interventionism, trusteeship, and 'native administration' in disguise.55 They 
highlight more critical attempts to engage with emancipation, justice, and identity.  They place what 
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Trindade describes as the ‘green and the cool’ and ‘tranquil time’- local understandings of peace 
and social justice- in relations with statebuilding and the interventionary practices of the 
international peace architecture, with mixed results. They point to what Constantinou and Visoka 
highlight: everyday productions of hybridity and relationality increasingly experienced at the state 
level. This, I would suggest, is an inevitable outcome of the mix of power, sovereignty, problem-
solving, and progressive aspirations, which emanate from these contradictory frameworks of 
understanding and sites of power upon which policy-making for peace is often based.  In response, 
these three scholars speak of hybridity, agency, resistance, relationality and alterity in the context of 
their own countries and in northern modernity, but also still engage with the state and the 
international architecture.56 They are very aware of the iniquitous nature of their own positionality 
(and privileges). They accept the post-colonial notion of hybridity is often against the interests of 
their political community, but that its engagement with liberal and local frameworks provides space 
for development. They are involved in different political projects. Two of them want settled states 
and norms on both autonomous and cosmopolitan terms. The other wants unsettled frameworks to 
be mediated through politics, knowledge, culture, and affective dimensions hitherto unrecognized 
by the modern state.  We can see the workings of power on knowledge, the agonistic nature of this 
relationship because of the multiple sources of both, and the longer-term ‘reassembling of the 
social’57 after war. The ambiguities of context are matched by those of intervention.58 They all seem 
to point to the need for broader ontological approaches to peace and order across local to global 
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scales, informed by mediated epistemologies and methodologies. They write, act, and exercise 
forms of authority according to their own legitimately accrued constituencies. Their engagement 
indicates hybridity, relationality, mobility, flexibility, and fluidity, as the way in which peace might 
be made, meaning the state and international architecture is increasingly anachronistic in the way 
that it focuses on rebuilding territorialised states. 
Though my approach must be caveat ridden, having written this experimental, ethno-
biographical paper, I am all the more intrigued about the potential of the ethnographic-biographical 
methodological approach that it engages with, and what it may show about peace in a globalizing 
world of difference, inequality, and injustice. Clearly there is much to learn from subjects if 
‘experts’ are to rule legitimately.  
One clear implication relates to the production of expert knowledge in external institutions 
involved in a range of interventions, which without the subjects I have foregrounded is probably 
methodologically unsound and unethical. This points to another implication relating to the way 
citations of sources are organized in both academic and policy writing on conflict zones. The 
standard citation structure, which represents the structure of knowledge  and power in northern-
centric terms, starts with theories produced in the global north, and then data uncovered by the same 
researchers or local researchers in the global south or conflict-affected societies using those 
northern theories and methods. The conclusions to such writings often then returns to foregrounding 
northern theories about war and peace perhaps with some adjustment for any findings. My 
biographies above show that both data and theories are being produced in other and perhaps more 
significant sites and the standard citation structures represents hegemony, not necessarily veracity 
(which biography cannot fully claim either). Imagine an article or report in which the structure of 
knowledge, theory and methods represented through citations in each section- introduction, theory, 
methods, discussion, and conflict, represents the scholarship I have outlined in my biographies. 
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Policy and scholarly documents on these three cases would in the main be very difference. It may 
well represent a step forward in understanding conflict dynamics, the ability to develop an 
emancipatory form of peace, coming to terms with bias and positionality, and the production of a 
contextualized but also scalar, hybrid, relation, mobile, and networked understanding of how 
conflict is perpetuated and what might be done. 
Relatedly, it is notable how many professors of IR or practitioners in the international civil 
service emerged from conflict situations, via refugee camps, disruption, and loss associated with 
war, but found a voice within the spaces provided by various liberal universities, NGOs, 
peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development programmes- sometimes even learning the languages 
of intervention (and not just “English”)- but also developing an alternative, hybrid voice. It speaks 
of a higher level of peace and justice because it offers the subaltern perspective of the power 
structures which maintain conflict or a non-peace. The three scholars discussed in this article 
occupy a liminal space from an international perspective. They speak multiple languages but 
conduct much of their work in a language which is not their own, and in a world which they have 
not yet made. They are a still rarity: grounded in empirical, but inevitably subjective, knowledge 
that internationals cannot reach, but which they can translate where they are given the opportunity 
for both international and local audiences. They have had to suffer internationals talking about their 
conflicts and setting the guidelines for their peace. They normally accept such tutelage with good 
grace. And yet, they want such input, and disseminate it locally to both society and those in elite 
and predatory power structures. They also attempt to educate their international partners in the ways 
of their contexts (including myself). They grew up with their conflicts and the interventions, and at 
least two of them had their life-chances significantly improved by intervention and peacebuilding. 
They have made a concrete difference in their own states.  All three also point to or have uncovered 
local practices and ways of thinking about security, politics, conflict, and peace, in order engage 
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with broader questions of legitimacy and identity, which they think internationals miss. Along with 
rational-legal and secular governance and law issues, they point to the emotions of nationalism, the 
desire for autonomy, in which to conduct religious or spiritual, or identity based rituals of political 
organization. They want contribute to order and peace at home, but they have to display bravery, 
tact, diplomacy and often work dubious elites they know well, with social practices they recognize 
as problematic, with internationals who may be committed to an incommensurate set of interests 
and norms.  
All three of my subjects are not content with problem-solving and formalist methodologies- 
one or two are of the view this constitutes an erasure- and are concerned about but also embrace 
aspects of euro-centricity in politics. They focus on ethnographic methodology in connection with 
various mainstream or critical western approaches, often taking a philosophical and pragmatic 
approach simultaneously, to engage with more everyday dimensions of IR, but they acknowledge 
the structural power of the state, great powers, and the global economy. They recognize they need 
this power, but that they also have their own critical agency. They acknowledge legal-rationalism, 
but point to important political dimensions that constitute legitimate authority, and more 
specifically peaceful order, which falls outside of the Weberian, technocratic epistemology allied to 
notions of the liberal state and global governance. Two of them see the nation-state as essential to 
political survival, whilst one is unsure. All of them are ambivalent about intervention, nationalism, 
territorialism, outside trusteeship style authority, and global capital. Yet, all them are deeply torn 
about their own societies’ capacity to produce a peaceful order, being very concerned about the 
problem of transforming entrenched local and international power-structures that support 
nationalism, inequality, patriarchy, securitization, extremism, and unaccountable decision-making. 
Yet, opportunities and privileges they may have had and adversities they have faced 
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notwithstanding, none of them betray apathy about the quality of peace and the nature of its politics. 
Tranquility they do not have, yet. 
 
 
